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VICE-A-VERDICT: LEGALLY INCONSISTENT JURY 
VERDICTS SHOULD NOT STAND IN MARYLAND 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider this situation-Emily is charged with possession of a 
controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and possession of a CDS 
with intent to distribute. It intuitively follows that in order to be 
convicted of possession with intent to distribute, Emily must first 
be convicted of possession because actual possession is an integral 
element of the greater crime. I Common sense indicates that an 
acquittal for possession and a conviction for possession with intent 
to distribute would be reversed by the appellate courts, as the jury 
has essentially indicated that the crime has both been committed 
and not committed at the same time.2 
Verdicts such as this are called inconsistent verdicts. 
Inconsistent verdicts defy more than logic-they run contrary to 
many principles of law. As mandated by the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Constitution, each element of a crime must be 
proven by the government beyond a reasonable doubt in order to 
convict the accused. 3 Therefore, if a jury acquits Emily of simple 
possession, but convicts her of possession with intent to distribute, 
then it follows that the government has not proven simple 
possession beyond a reasonable doubt. Without proving this 
element, the crime of possession with intent to distribute cannot 
logically have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as simple 
possession is an integral element of distribution. Furthermore, 
verdict inconsistencies such as this may signify that the jurors were 
not truly convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 4 
I. In People v. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d 617,619 n.2 (N.Y. 1981), the court provided an 
excellent example: 
[If] a defendant is charged with two crimes: charge I requires 
proof of elements A, Band C; charge 2 requires proof of elements A, 
B, C and D. A conviction on charge 2 would be repugnant to an 
acquittal on charge I as the latter verdict would necessarily involve a 
finding that at least one of the essential elements of charge 2 was not 
proven. 
2. Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent 
Verdicts, III HARV. L. REV. 771, 773-74 (1998). 
3. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."). 
4. Steven T. Wax, Inconsistent and Repugnant Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 713, 739 (1979). 
395 
396 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 35 
Alarmingly, verdicts like this are automatically affirmed by 
most appellate courts.5 In fact, almost every state in the union has 
chosen to follow the Supreme Court's unanimous decision 
concerning inconsistent jury verdicts.6 However, this is not 
necessarily evidence of the doctrine's efficiency or fairness. 
Rather, it speaks to the extent that this problem permeates our 
judicial system and the urgent need for reform. 
This comment will first discuss what constitutes an inconsistent 
verdict, and the Supreme Court's rationale for allowing 
inconsistent verdicts to stand.? Secondly, it will examine the 
reasons why inconsistent verdicts occur and explain why these 
reasons are unworthy ofprotection.8 Next it will detail Maryland's 
approach to inconsistent verdicts.9 It will then focus upon Alaska, 
New York, and Florida-the only states which allow inconsistent 
verdicts to be reversed. IO This comment will then explain each 
jurisdiction's approach to inconsistent verdicts and use lessons 
gathered from each jurisdiction's practices in formulating an 
approach for Maryland. II Next it will detail a more concrete 
definition to use in identifying inconsistent verdicts. 12 This 
comment will conclude by explaining possible alternatives to the 
Supreme Court's means of dealing with inconsistent verdicts, and 
it will propose the best course of action for Maryland. 13 
II. WHAT IS AN INCONSISTENT VERDICT AND WHY ARE 
THEY UPHELD? 
A. What is an Inconsistent Verdict? 
Inconsistency in the verdict is a fairly fluid concept, which has 
eluded specific and uniform definition. 14 Generally, it is 
"understood to mean some logical impossibility or improbability 
[that] is implicit in the jury's findings as to the various counts of 
the indictment or [the] information [presented at trial].,,15 
5. Muller, supra note 2, at 774. 
6. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict as Between 
Different Counts of Indictment or Information, 18 A.L.R.3d 259, 274-79 (1968). 
See also Tucker, 431 N.E.2d at 618. 
7. See infra Pan II.B-C. 
8. See infra Part Ill. 
9. See infra Part IV. 
10. See infra Part V. 
II. See infra Part V. 
12. See infra Part VI. 
13. See infra Parts VII-VIII. 
14. See Wax, supra note 4, at 713. 
15. People v. Frye, 898 P.2d 559, 566 n.9 (Colo. 1995) (quoting Shipley, supra note 
6, at 287). 
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Consequently, inconsistent verdicts may arise from both factual l6 
and legal considerations. 17 Generally, there are two forms of 
legally inconsistent verdicts-multiple count inconsistencies as to 
a single defendant and inconsistencies between multiple 
defendants. 18 Multiple defendant inconsistencies occur when the 
jury acquits all but one defendant for a crime, which by its very 
definition requires more than one actor. 19 While multiple 
defendant inconsistencies and factual inconsistencies present 
serious issues, this comment will focus only on multiple count 
inconsistencies. 
Defining a multiple count inconsistency is fairly complicated,z° 
Some identify multiple count inconsistencies as occurring where 
"an acquittal on one count negates a necessary element for 
conviction upon another count.,,21 This, generally, is the simplest 
form of an inconsistent verdict and occurs when a defendant is 
convicted of a greater count and acquitted of a lesser-included 
offense,22 which this comment will refer to as a "lesser-included 
inconsistency." Arguably, another type of multiple count 
inconsistency occurs when a defendant is convicted of a compound 
offense, but acquitted of the necessary predicate offense.23 While 
16. A factually inconsistent verdict occurs when juries render different verdicts on 
crimes with distinct elements when there was only one set of proof given at trial, 
which makes the verdicts illogical. Wax, supra note 4, at 740. For example, 
suppose John is charged with the rape and murder of Sue and that both crimes 
were committed against Sue on the same night by one person. Assuming that the 
state does not use the felony murder theory, the conviction of John for murder, 
but his acquittal for rape does not produce a legal inconsistency because the 
elements of the two crimes do not overlap. On the other hand, if the only 
evidence presented by the defense was an out-of-state alibi for John then the 
jury's only logical alternatives would have been to either convict for both 
offenses, if they did not believe his alibi, or to acquit on both offenses if they did 
believe his alibi. If, based on such an alibi, the jury stiU convicted John of 
murder and acquitted him of rape, the verdict would be considered factually 
inconsistent because it makes no sense in light of the facts raised at trial. 
17. Frye, 898 P.2d at 566 n.9. 
18. Muller, supra note 2, at 778. 
19. See id. at 779. Crimes which require more than one actor include conspiracy, 
adultery, fornication, miscegenation, bigamy and dueling. Id. (citing lanelli v. 
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 781 n.13, 782 (1975)). Probably the most 
commonly prosecuted example in today's society is the crime of conspiracy. 
Muller, supra note 2, at 779. 
20. See Wax, supra note 4, at 713. 
21. Gonzalez v. State, 440 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. \983). See also 
Muller, supra note 2, at 778-79 (giving an example of a case of inconsistency 
occurring in a case with a compound charge). 
22. Wax, supra note 4, at 728. See, e.g., People v. Carbonell, 358 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 
1976) (convicting defendant of robbery but acquitting him of petit larceny). See 
also supra Part I. (fact hypothetical). 
23. See, e.g., Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 53, 512 A.2d 358,361 (1986) (finding that if 
a jury acquits an accused of a felony or crime of violence, but convicts the 
accused of use of a handgun in the commission of such felony or crime of 
violence, the jury has rendered inconsistent verdicts). 
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some jurisdictions refer to this type of multiple count inconsistency 
as a "true" or "legal" inconsistency,24 this comment will refer to it 
as a "compound inconsistency." 
B. The United States Supreme Court's Stand on Inconsistent 
Verdicts 
In 1932 the Supreme Court held in Dunn v. United States,25 that 
criminal defendants who were convicted by a jury on one count 
could not attack that conviction on the basis of the jury's rendering 
an acquittal on another count. 26 The Court further held that 
consistency in the verdict was not necessary and that each count of 
an indictment should be treated as if it were in a separate 
indictment.27 The Court noted that these verdicts could be the 
result of compromise, mistake, or lenity but that these "verdicts 
cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.,,28 
Fifty-two years later the Supreme Court noted in United States 
v. PoweU29 that its decision in Dunn could be explained as "a 
recognition of the jury's historic function ... [to act] as a check 
against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the Executive 
Branch.,,30 In Powell, the Court recognized that inconsistent 
verdicts are a clear indication that the jury has disobeyed the 
court's instructions?! However, as "it is unclear whose ox has 
been gored" by this disobedience, the Court chose to allow 
inconsistent verdicts to stand.32 Essentially, the Court argued that 
since the mistake could have occurred to the detriment of either the 
defendant or the state, the defendant should not be allowed to 
challenge a conviction as the state may not challenge an 
acquittal. 33 Furthermore, the Court rejected the possibility of 
24. Gonzalez, 440 So. 2d. at 515. 
25. 284 U.S. 390 (1932). 
26.. Id. at 393-94. Justice Butler, however, disagreed with the court's holding stating 
in his dissent, "[olne accused in different counts of an indictment of the same 
crime, there being no difference in the means alleged to have been employed, 
may not be adjudged guilty on a verdict of conviction on one count and of 
acquittal on the other." Id. at 402 (Butler, 1., dissenting). 
27. Id. at 393. 
28. ld. at 393-94. 
29. 469 U.S. 57 (1984) (upholding Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932». 
Defendant, Betty Lou Powell, was convicted of the compound offense of using a 
telephone to facilitate other felonies. !d. at 59-60. The jury acquitted her of all 
the charged underlying felonies. ld. Powell argued, and the government 
conceded, that these verdicts were inconsistent as it is necessary to prove at least 
one underlying felony beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict the accused 
for the compound offense of telephone facilitation. Id. at 60-61 n.5. 
30. Id. at 65. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 65-66. 
33. Id. at 65. The Government may not appeal a judgment of not guilty against a 
criminal defendant. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989), 
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individual assessments of inconsistent verdicts because this would 
require speculation as to the jury's deliberations.34 Finally, the 
Court held that criminal defendants receive sufficient protection 
against jury irrationality and error by the sufficiency of the 
evidence review which is conducted at the trial and appellate 
leve1.35 Additionally, the Court explicitly found that there was no 
exception to this rule when a criminal defendant is acquitted of the 
predicate felony, but convicted of the compound felony.36 The 
Court argues that reversing convictions of this nature would 
require the assumption that the acquittal on the predicate felony 
was the one that the jury "really meant," when all the court truly 
knows is that the verdict is inconsistent.37 The Court ultimately 
concluded that "the Government's inability to invoke review, the 
general reluctance to inquire into the workings of the jury, and the 
possible exercise of lenity-suggest that the best course to take is 
simply to insulate jury verdicts from review on this ground.,,38 
C. The Supreme Court's Reasoning-faulty or formidable? 
Essentially, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Powell consists 
of three major points: (1) because there is no way to determine 
abrogated on other grounds by Hudson v, United States, 522 U.S, 93 (1997), See 
also U,S, CONST, amend, V (providing that "nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"). 
34. Powell, 469 U.S. at 66. Federal courts have resisted the urge to inquire into jury 
deliberations in order to preserve an element of finality, Id, at 67. To enforce 
this policy decision, the Federal Rules of Evidence state that jurors are generally 
incompetent to testify about jury proceedings, FED. R. EVID, 606(b), In 
McDonald v. Pless, the Court explained the importance of such a prohibition: 
[L Jet it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and 
publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the 
testimony of those who took part in their publication and all verdicts 
could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of 
discovering something which might invalidate the finding, Jurors 
would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to 
secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct 
sufficient to set aside a verdict If evidence thus secured could be thus 
used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private 
deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation, , , . 
238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915). 
35. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67. This review determines whether the evidence presented 
at trial was sufficient to support a rational determination of guilt, Id. See also 
infra Part II.e.3, 
36, Powell, 469 U.S, at 67-68 (stating that such an exception would "threaten[] to 
swallow the rule"), The Court explicitly noted, however, that its opinion on 
inconsistent verdicts did not apply to cases whcre a defendant is convicted of two 
crimes in a situation where a finding of guilt on one count excludes a finding of 
guilt on another count. ld at 69 n.8 (citing United States v. Daigle, 149 P, Supp, 
409 (D,D.C. 1957) (holding that finding a defendant guilty of larceny and 
embezzlement for the same act cannot stand so the court could direct an acquittal 
of the larceny count), aff'd per curiam, 248 F.2d 608 (U,S. App. D.e. 1957». 
37, Powell, 469 U.S. at 68. 
38. ld. at 68-69, 
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why a jury rendered an inconsistent verdict, such verdicts should 
be upheld in the interest of protecting lenity;39 (2) because the 
government may not appeal inconsistent acquittals, it is only fair to 
prevent defendants from appealing inconsistent convictions; 40 and 
(3) any harm that could result from an inconsistent verdict is 
prevented by sufficiency ofthe evidence review.41 
1. Inconsistent Verdicts Should Be Upheld in Order to Protect 
Lenity 
The Supreme Court's first argument is perhaps its weakest, as it 
overstates the value of lenity42 and underestimates the price of 
allowing inconsistent verdicts rendered by mistake or compromise 
to stand.43 Essentially, the Court refuses to reverse inconsistent 
verdicts under the rather hypocritical argument that it is for the 
defendant's own good as reversal would endanger jury lenity.44 
But if jury lenity results only in acquittals, as the Court assumes it 
does,45 how would appellate reversal of inconsistent convictions 
endanger the concept of lenity?46 Rationally, it appears that the 
only action which could truly endanger a defendant's chance for 
lenity would be appellate reversal of inconsistent acquittals, which 
is not a real threat as it is precluded by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.47 
Perhaps most damaging is what the Court is willing to accept 
and impose upon criminal defendants in order to protect lenity.48 
While lenity is a plausible explanation for inconsistent verdicts, 
these verdicts may also be explained by confusion, mistake or 
compromise.49 Because the Court has no way of knowing how 
often verdicts are the result of lenity, the Court gambles with 
possibly remote odds to protect lenity at the cost of establishing the 
same protections for jury confusion, mistake, and compromise as 
well.56 
39. Id. at 65-67. Muller refers to this as the argument from uncertainty. Muller, 
supra note 2, at 794. 
40. Powell, 469 U.S. at 65. Muller refers to this as the Court's argument from equity. 
Muller, supra note 2, at 806. 
41. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67. Muller calls this the Court's argument from remedy. 
Muller, supra note 2, at 812. 
42. See infra Part lILe. (discussing reasons why jury lenity is not necessarily worth 
protecting). 
43. See Muller, supra note 2, at 794-806. 
44. Id. at 795. 
45. See Powell, 469 U.S. at 66. 
46. Muller, supra note 2, at 794-95. 
47. Id. at 795. 
48. Id. at 798. 
49. Powell, 469 at 65. See infra Part lILA-B. (discussing why verdicts rendered 
through compromise or mistake arc unworthy of protecting). 
50. Muller, supra note 2, at 795. 
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2. Defendants May Not Appeal Inconsistent Convictions 
Because the State May Not Appeal Acquittals 
401 
The Court's second argument is, on its face, only an attempt to 
make the playing field between the individual and the state more 
even. In actuality, this argument goes against constitutional 
principles and alters the balance between the individual and the 
state in an unfair manner. 51 The Bill of Rights provides criminal 
defendants with many constitutional rights that protect them from 
the state.52 However, instead of honoring the defendant's 
advantage as a constitutional mandate to protect individuals from a 
powerful state, the Court shields the state from the fuJI weight of 
the Bill of Rights' guarantees and strips defendants of a ground for 
appeal.53 The Court's decision, instead of preventing the 
defendant from gaining an undue advantage, allows the state to 
shirk its burden that is imposed by the Bill of Rights.54 
3. Defendants Receive Sufficient Protection from "Sufficiency of 
the Evidence" Review 
The Court's third argument, that defendants already receive 
sufficient protection from jury irrationality55 is also misplaced as 
"sufficiency review is simply too toothless and too deferential to 
the jury and its irrational verdict.,,56 In Jackson v. Virginia,s7 the 
court held that in order to ensure a jury's compliance with the 
reasonable doubt standard, appellate courts should determine 
whether there was sufficient evidence to reasonably warrant a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.58 This test requires 
judges to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the state 
and to ask whether a rational trier of fact could have found all of 
the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 59 The court 
noted that this test infringed upon jury discretion only to the extent 
needed to ensure "the fundamental protection of due process of 
51. [d. at 806. 
52. !d. See U.S. CaNST. amend. V (including the right to indictment by a grand jury, 
the right against self-incrimination, the right to due process of law, and the right 
to be protected from double jeopardy); U.S. CaNST. amend. VI (including the 
right to counsel, the right to a speedy trial, the right to subpoena witnesses, the 
right to confront witnesses, and the right to an impartial jury). 
53. Muller, supra note 2, at 806-07. 
54. Jd. 
55. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67. 
56. Muller, supra note 2, at 824. 
57. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
58. [d. at317-18. 
59. !d. at 319. See also Hodge v. United States, 13 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1926) (viewing 
evidence in favor of government to see if testimony is sufficient to warrant 
conviction in appeal of conviction); Fitzgerald v. United States, 29 F.2d 881 (6th 
Cir. 1929) (viewing evidence in favor of government to see if sufficient evidence 
warrants conviction in appeal of conviction). 
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law.,,60 While this test does not advocate blind trust of jury 
verdicts, it still shows substantial deference to the jury's 
determination61 and is rarely used to overturn convictions.62 
TIT. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EXPLANATIONS 
PROVIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
It would appear that juries can reach inconsistent verdicts in 
innumerable ways, but in fact, there are only a few, and each 
constitutes a violation of the court's instructions.63 Juries deliver 
inconsistent verdicts based on three general reasons: mistake, 
compromise, or lenity.64 These three reasons, however, are 
unworthy of protection by the Supreme Court. The following 
section will explain how each may arise and discuss the problems 
associated with protecting mistake, compromise, and lenity. 
A. Mistake 
The most obvious reason for a jury to render an inconsistent 
verdict is through simple mistake. The jury may misunderstand 
the court's instructions on the law or improperly apply the facts to 
the law.65 For example, a jury might mistakenly believe that it is 
not necessary to convict on the predicate felony in order to find the 
defendant guilty of a compound crime.66 While errors of this sort 
are unintentional and presumably not committed in bad faith, they 
still amount to a failure to follow the court's instructions and 
undeniably hurt defendants.67 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never insinuated that one 
of the benefits of our jury system is that juries are allowed to make 
mistakes and apply the law incorrectly without disruption. 68 In 
fact, the Supreme Court has taken pains to carefully examine jury 
instructions, which implies that confusion or error that could arise 
from those instructions is of great concern. 69 
60. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 
61. Muller, supra note 2, at 823. The Court noted, "the relevant question is whether . 
. . any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 
62. Jon O. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 989 
(1993) (stating that courts "occasionally" find that the evidence was insufficient, 
but that the test is usually used "to overturn a conviction on a particular count of a 
multi-count indictment, rather than to exonerate a defendant entirely"). 
63. Muller, supra note 2, at 781-85. 
64. Powell v. United States, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984). 
65. Muller, supra note 2, at 782. 
66. !d. 
67. Jd. at 782, 796. 
68. Jd. at 795. 
69. Id.; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (holding that jury 
instructions violate due process if they fail to give effect to the requirement that 
the state must prove every element of an offense). See also Wax, supra note 4, at 
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B. Compromise 
Compromise verdicts are perhaps the most troubling means of 
reaching an inconsistent verdict, as they constitute a willful and 
conscious disregard of the court's instructions.7o Compromise 
verdicts arise when, in an attempt to reach a verdict after being 
unable to achieve unanimity, the jury essentially splits the 
difference and negotiates a verdict.7! In civil cases, compromise 
verdicts manifest themselves in damage awards,72 and in criminal 
cases, compromise verdicts "relate[] to [the] number[] of counts 
and the lesser included offenses.,,73 
On its face, jury compromise does not appear that harmful-it 
resolves cases, clears dockets, and prevents mistrials.74 
Compromise verdicts, however, are contrary to the court's 
instructions and demean the reasonable doubt standard.75 In 
Maryland, juries are required to render unanimous verdicts/6 but 
are specifically warned "not [to] surrender your honest belief as to 
the weight or effect of the evidence only because of the opinion of 
your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of reaching a verdict.,,77 
Compromise verdicts also dishonor the requirement of true 
unanimity because each member has essentially surrendered his or 
her honestly held belief as to whether the defendant is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt in the name of expediency and false 
unanimi ty. 78 
Furthermore, when a compromise verdict is rendered, the 
criminal defendant is always harmed by this sacrifice of the 
reasonable doubt standard due to a violation of his or her 
constitutionally protected rights. 79 Ironically, this harm is 
unnecessary as a mistrial does not automatically allow defendants 
to "get off'-if the jury followed the courts instructions and a 
741 (stating that the importance of jury instructions stems from "the fact that the 
judge's charge ... is often the controlling factor in jury deliberations"). 
70. Muller, supra note 2, at 784. 
71. Jd. at 782. 
72. See, e.g, McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 265-66 (1915) (The jury reached a 
damage award by averaging the sum of what each juror believed the plaintiff was 
entitled to receive). 
73. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,235 (1978). 
74. Muller, supra note 2, at 784, 796. 
75. Jd. 
76. MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.03 (2005) ("Your verdict 
must represent the considered judgment of each juror and must be unanimous. "). 
77. Jd § 2.01 (emphasis added). Therefore, when a jury renders a verdict via 
compromise, they are in direct violation of the court's instructions. See id. 
78. Muller, supra note 2, at 784. 
79. Jd at 796. 
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hung jury resulted, the government is not precluded from retrying 
the defendant on those charges.8o 
C. Lenity 
The final way inconsistent verdicts may be rendered is through 
an exercise of what the Supreme Court refers to as "lenity.,,81 
Lenity occurs when a jury acquits a defendant even though it is 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guiltY 
There are generally two instances in which lenity is exercised-
when the jury believes that the law punishes conduct which is not 
morally blameworthl3 or when the jury believes that this 
particular defendant should not be punished for violating the law.84 
The Supreme Court, however, makes a critical assumption, 
presumably due to the ambiguity of the general verdict, that 
inconsistent verdicts are, in fact, the result oflenity.85 The Court's 
80. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978) (stating that mistrials 
based upon a jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict is the "classic basis" 
for declaring a mistrial); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (stating 
that mistrials based upon hung juries are "prototypical example[s]" of the 
"manifest necessity" which is generally required to overcome the double jeopardy 
bar to a second trial). 
81. Powell v. United States, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984); Muller, supra note 2, at 784. In 
his article in support of upholding inconsistent verdicts, Alexander Bickel 
explained the importance of permitting juries to render inconsistent verdicts due 
to the value oflenity: 
The law states duties and liabilities in black and white terms. 
Human actions are frequently not as clean-cut. Judges themselves 
sometimes undertake, in sentencing, the search for a middle ground 
between the absolutes of conviction and acquittal. To deny the jury a 
share in this endeavor is to deny the essence of thc jury's function, in 
which "law and justice do not coincide." 
Alexander M. Bickel, Comment, Judge and Jury ~ Inconsistent Verdicts in the 
Federal Courts, 63 HARV. L. REv. 649, 651-52 (1950) (footnotes omitted). 
82. Muller, supra note 2, at 784. See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury 
Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253, 253-54 (1996) (calling this phenomenon 
"nullification" and describing it as a jury's power to "acquit against the 
evidence"). 
83. Muller, supra note 2, at 784; Leipold, supra note 82, at 297-98. 
84. Muller, supra note 2, at 784; Leipold, supra note 82, at 301-02 (explaining that 
jury nulIification occurs "when the harm caused by the defendant is de minimis, 
when the victim's conduct contributed to the harm, when jurors believe the 
defendant already has suffered enough, and when the government appears to have 
acted improperly"). 
85. Muller, supra note 2, at 805; Wax, supra note 4, at 739. In Steckler v. United 
States, the court said, "[w]e interpret the acquittal as no more than [the jury's] 
assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they 
were disposed through lenity. That the conviction may havc been the result of 
some compromise is, of course, possible ... " 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d CiT. 1925). 
Contra Chad W. Coulter, Comment, The Unnecessary Rule oj Consistency in 
Conspiracy Trials, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 223, 241 (1986) (stating that relying on the 
Supreme Court's assumption "does not reflect a wholesale rejection of 
defendants' rights, but a prudent balancing of the role of the jury and the need to 
ensure the accuracy of criminal convictions"). 
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reliance on this assumption, in the words of one commentator, "is a 
serious breach of the systemic protections designed to ensure a 
sound basis for conviction for criminal defendants.,,86 
Additionally, the true value of lenity has been greatly 
exaggerated by the Supreme Court through its willingness to 
accept compromise and mistake verdicts in order to protect 
lenity.87 Perhaps most importantly, the Court wrongly assumes 
that the exercise of lenity only burdens the government. 88 The 
Court fails to recognize that the power to exercise lenity inherently 
includes the power to render verdicts out of hostility or ~rejudice 
as they are "opposite faces ofthe coin of jury discretion.,,8 
Another important consideration is that jury lenity is not 
constitutional in nature90 and the Court has previously held that 
defendants are not entitled to a jury which will set aside the law.9l 
Moreover, inconsistent verdicts based on lenity are a disregard of 
the court's instructions.92 Jury instructions require that if guilt is 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be 
convicted.93 While a jury's exercise of lenity cannot be 
86. Wax, supra note 4, at 739. 
87. See Powell v. United States, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984) (discussing why verdicts 
based on lenity should be protected). See supra Part IIl.A-B. (discussing why 
mistake and compromise are not worthy of protection by the Court). 
88. Powell, 469 U.S. at 66; Muller, supra note 2, at 794. 
89. Muller, supra note 2, at 803-05; Leipold, supra note 82, at 304 ("For every case 
where the jury extends mercy to a deserving defendant, there may well be another 
(or two, or five others) where the verdict is based on improper considerations."). 
See, e.g., Reed v. State, 103 So. 97 (Ala. Ct. App. 1925) (reversing the conviction 
of a black man for violating miscegenation statute since his white wife was 
acquitted and Alabama law held it was a crime that could not be committed by 
one person). 
90. Muller, supra note 2, at 797. 
91. Jd. In Spar! v. United States, the Court said, 
Public and private safety alike would be in peril if the principle 
be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the 
law as expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto 
themselves. Under such a system ... jurymen, untrained in the law, 
would determine questions affecting life, liberty, or property 
according to such legal principles as, in their judgment, were 
applicable to the particular case being tried. 
156 U.S. 51, 101 (1895). The Court pointed out that "the result would be that the 
enforcement of the law against criminals[,] and the protection of citizens against 
unjust and groundless prosecutions, would depend entirely upon juries 
uncontroiled by any settled, fixed, legal principles." !d. at 101-02. 
92. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d CiT. 1997) (stating that 
"nullification is, by definition, a violation of a juror's oath to apply the law as 
instructed by the court"). 
93. Muller, supra note 2, at 785. 
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prevented,94 this does not necessarily make its exercise lawful or 
desirable.95 
Considering these many issues-namely, the exaggerated value 
of lenity and the under appreciated cost of compromise and 
mistake-the Court's decision to protect lenity appears 
incongruous. 
IV. MARYLAND HAS ADOPTED THE HOLDING OF 
POWELL 
This comment will now discuss Maryland's approach to 
inconsistent verdicts in both criminal and civil cases. It will also 
explain Maryland's policy on jury instructions regarding 
consistency in the verdict. 
A. Inconsistent Verdicts in Criminal Cases 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Powell was not based on 
constitutional considerations and, therefore, the states are not 
bound by the Court's decision.96 Despite its freedom to hold 
otherwise, thc Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the holding 
in Powelt7 and has consistently rejected inconsistent verdicts as a 
sufficient reason to void convictions.98 The court has continued to 
uphold these verdicts due to the "unique role of the jury" in our 
justice system.99 The court has further held that such verdicts will 
be accepted without proof of an actual irregularity. toO However, 
inconsistent verdicts in Maryland will not be upheld if there was 
insufficient evidence or if it is apparent from the record that the 
94. Id. at 785-86. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (stating that 
a verdict of acquittal is final and that the state may not obtain a new trial through 
an appeal even if the verdict appears erroneous). 
95. Muller, supra note 2, at 786; United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The Washington court stated, 
A jury has no more "right" to find a "guilty" defendant "not 
guilty" than it has to find a "not guilty" defendant "guilty," and the 
fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter 
can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law. 
Id. at 494. 
96. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984) ("[N]othing in the Constitution 
would require such a protection, and we therefore address the problem only under 
our supervisory powers over the federal criminal process[.]"); Wilson v. Turpin, 5 
Gill 56, 58 (Md. 1847) (holding that the decisions of the Supreme Court 
construing the federal constitution and acts of Congress are conclusive and 
binding upon the states). 
97. Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 54,512 A.2d 358,362 (1986). 
98. Ford v. State, 274 Md. 546, 552, 337 A.2d 81, 85 (1975). See Wright v. State, 
307 Md. 552, 576, 515 A.2d 1157, 1169 (\986). 
99. Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 594-95, 479 A.2d 1344,1349 (1984). 
100. Hoffert v. State, 319 Md. 377, 389, 572 A.2d 536, 542 (1990) (Chasanow, J., 
dissenting). See also Ledbetter v. State, 224 Md. 271, 273-74, 167 A.2d 596, 
597-98 (1961). 
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jury was misled by the court's instructions and that the error did 
not result from lenity, compromise, or mistake. lol While an 
inconsistent acquittal on one count does not prevent a conviction 
upon another count from standing,102 Maryland recognizes the 
exception noted by the Supreme Court and requires that a finding 
of guilt on two incompatible counts will be declared invalid. 103 
Interestingly, inconsistent verdicts which are rendered by the 
court and not by the jury are considered reversible error in 
Maryland. 104 The court explained this policy by pointing out that it 
would make no sense to require judges to give instructions to juries 
which explain the law and then give the judges license to ignore 
those rules. 105 
B. Inconsistent Verdicts in Civil Cases 
It is also interesting to consider Maryland's approach to 
inconsistent verdicts in civil cases. In the recent case of Southern 
Management Corporation v. Taha,106 the Court of Appeals held it 
was error for the trial court to allow irreconcilably inconsistent 
verdicts to stand in civil cases. I 07 However, the court pointed out 
the irrationality of this holding by noting that the same jury 
interplay occurs when rendering a civil verdict as when a criminal 
verdict is rendered and that this interplay allows for the same 
opportunities for mistake, compromise, or lenity.108 Furthermore, 
the court specifically added, in a footnote, that "[w]e leave for 
101. Bates v. State, 127 Md. App. 678, 695-96, 736 A.2d 407,416 (1999). 
102. Leet v. State, 203 Md. 285, 293, 100 A.2d 789, 793 (1953). 
103. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for Supreme Court's exception. See 
also Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 617,42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945). In Heinze, the 
defendants were charged with stealing twenty dollars and with receiving twenty 
dollars they knew to be stolen and were convicted of both. Id. at 615, 42 A.2d at 
129. The court held that a thief cannot be guilty of the crime of receiving stolen 
goods which he himself has stolen, and a guilty receiver of those stolen goods. 
ld. at 617, 42 A.2d at 130. Therefore, the court held the verdict "inconsistent in 
law." Id. But see State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501,516-17,515 A.2d 465,472-73 
(1986) (holding that the elements for the crimes of assault with intent to murder 
and assault with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable are mutually exclusive or 
inconsistent and that the conviction for assault with intent to maim, disfigure, or 
disable should be merged into the conviction for assault with intent to murder). 
104. Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 57-58, 512 A.2d 358, 363-64 (1986). 
105. Id. at 57, 512 A.2d at 363. 
106. 378 Md. 461, 836 A.2d 627 (2003). 
107. Id. at 495, 836 A.2d at 647. Taha sued Southern Management Corporation 
(SMC) and two individual employees of SMC for malicious prosecution. ld. at 
469-70, 836 A.2d at 632. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the individual 
employees, but found the employer liable for damages. Id. at 473-75,836 A.2d 
at 634-35. The Court of Appeals held that these verdicts were irreconcilably 
inconsistent under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 467, 836 A.2d at 
630. In fact, several other states have adopted policies similar to Taha in regard 
to inconsistent civil verdicts. !d. at 488·89,836 A.2d at 643. 
108. ld. at 487, 836 A.2d at 642. 
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another day the issue of whether this Court should reconsider its 
decision in criminal matters in which inconsistent verdicts have 
been rendered."lo9 This could be interpreted to imply a willingness 
on the part of the Court of Appeals to reexamine its position on 
inconsistent verdicts. 
C. Jury Instructions Regarding Inconsistent Verdicts 
Maryland courts have recognized, however, that inconsistent 
verdicts are not desirable and that an instruction from the presiding 
judge to render only consistent verdicts is beneficial in order to 
avoid convictions which are contrary to law. 110 According to the 
court, such an instruction is justified because "the jury retains its 
power to err, either fortuitously or deliberately, and to compromise 
or exercise lenity. It, therefore, retains the power to be the final 
arbiter in the determination of which, if any, of the crimes charged 
the accused is guilty." III 
V. OTHER JURISDICTIONS' APPROACHES TO 
INCONSISTENT VERDICTS 
In determining how Maryland should approach inconsistent 
verdicts, it is helpful to analyze other jurisdictions' approaches to 
the same issue. The vast majority of jurisdictions in the United 
States have followed the holding laid out by the Supreme Court in 
Powell v. United States. I 12 This comment will focus on Alaska, 
Florida, and New York as they are the only jurisdictions that do 
not automatically affirm inconsistent verdicts. I 13 These 
jurisdictions each take unique approaches to dealing with 
inconsistent verdicts. While Alaska has taken a more liberal 
approach by not requiring strict consistency, 114 Florida and New 
York attempt to differentiate between types of inconsistent 
verdicts I 15 and in doing so raise questions of policy and 
practicality. 
109. Id. at 488 n.8, 836 A.2d at 642 n.8. 
110. Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583,597,479 A.2d 1344, 1351 (1984). 
Ill. Id. at 597, 479 A.2d at 1351. This justification is incongruous, as verdicts that 
are rendered through compromise, mistake, or lenity are not actually in 
accordance with the law. See supra Part III.A--C. 
112. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
113. See injra Part V.A-B. Until fairly recently the minority of jurisdictions that 
rejected the holdings of Powell and Dunn was more substantial. See, e.g., People 
v. lones, 797 N.E.2d 640, 644-47 (Ill. 2003) (overruling People v. Klingenberg, 
665 N.E.2d 1370 (Ill. 1996) (declining to follow Powell)); State v. Ng, 750 P.2d 
632, 639-40 (Wash. 1988) (overruling State v. O'Neil, 167 P.2d 471 (Wash. 
1946) (holding that inconsistent verdicts must be reversed». 
114. See infra Part V.A. 
115. See infra Part V.s. 
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A. Alaska 
In 1970, the Supreme Court of Alaska held in DeSacia v. 
S 116 th t' . d' l' . d' 117 tate a Junes may not ren er stnct y mconslstent ver IctS. 
DeSacia was convicted of the manslaughter of Evangelista and 
acquitted of the manslaughter of Hogan. 118 Both men were 
occupants of the same pickup truck which was traveling ahead of 
DeSacia's vehicle. 1I9 While driving at night on a gravel road at 
high speeds, DeSacia moved into the left lane and attemRted to 
pass the pickup truck occupied by Evangelista and Hogan. I 0 As a 
result, Hogan lost control of the car and drove off the road and into 
the bordering river-killing both men. 121 Based on the 
circumstances, the court found that the two verdicts were 
"irreconcilably in conflict"122 as there was no conceivable way 
DeSacia's actions toward Evangelista were in any way different 
from his conduct toward Hogan. 123 
The court could not find any basis on which to assume that 
inconsistent verdicts are the result of lenity or that there was only 
an occasional risk of compromise verdicts. 124 The court concluded 
"[t]he truth is simply that we do not know, nor do we have any 
way of telling, how many inconsistent verdicts are attributable to 
feelings of leniency, to compromise, or, for that matter, to outright 
confusion on the part of the jury." 125 
The court held that DeSacia's acquittal had to stand as the 
Double Jeopardy Clause prevents retrial on that count, but ordered 
a retrial on the conviction as collateral estoppel did not apply. 126 
116. 469 P.2d 369 (Alaska 1970). 
117. Id. at 378. 
118. ld. at 370. 
119. ld. 
120. ld. 
121. /d. at 370-71. 
122. ld. at 373. The court never specifically used the terms "factual inconsistency." 
See generally DeSacia, 469 P.2d 369. However, the DeSacia verdict is a classic 
example of a factually inconsistent verdict. See supra note 16 and accompanying 
text. 
123. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 373-74. It should be noted that the crime charged in both 
indictments stemmed from the same alleged misconduct of DeSacia, specifically 
"his criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle." ld. at 373. Furthermore, 
the court noted, "it is virtually impossible to maintain that DeSacia was more 
negligent toward one or the other of the victims." ld. at 374. 
124. ld. at 377. 
125. ld. 
126. Id. at 381. The court reasoned it was unfair to allow the appellant to successfully 
argue that the inconsistency renders his conviction meaningless and to also 
maintain there was sufficient certainty to preclude retrial due to collateral 
estoppel. /d. The court believed that allowing the appellant to invoke collateral 
estoppel would "convert the guarantee of double jeopardy from a shield into a 
sword." Jd. (quoting United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir. 
1960». 
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Three years later the court noted that the level of inconsistency 
required by DeSacia to merit reversal is quite high. 127 Also, 
Alaskan courts have held that if a party or defendant wishes to 
challenge a jury's verdict on the basis that it is inconsistent, the 
challenge must be made prior to the jury's dismissal. 128 
B. Florida and New York 
While Alaska treats all forms of inconsistent verdicts as an error 
to be cured at the trial level,129 Florida and New York take a 
different approach in that both states differentiate between 
different types of inconsistencies when determining whether a 
reversible error has occurrcd. l3O New York reverses both 
compound and lesser-included inconsistencies based on a fairly 
concrete definition, but recognizes an exception to this rule and 
refuses to reverse compound inconsistencies involving felony 
murder. 131 However, even though Florida relies on essentially the 
same definition for identifying impermissible inconsistency as 
New York, 132 Florida jurisprudence only calls for the reversal of 
compound inconsistencies and not lesser included 
inconsistencies. 133 
1. New York 
New York draws a distinction between types of inconsistent 
verdicts-those verdicts that are merely inconsistent and those that 
are "repugnant.,,134 Merely inconsistent verdicts may stand in New 
127. Oaygce v. State, 514 P.2d 1159, 1168 (Alaska 1973) (affirming defendant's 
conviction and finding the facts of the case did not meet "the high level of 
inconsistency" required by DeSacia to merit reversal). See also Roberts v. State, 
680 P.2d 503, 506 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the inconsistency present 
in DeSacia was "obvious and unmistakable"). 
128. See Roberts, 680 P.2d at 507 (holding "that claims of inconsistent jury verdicts in 
criminal cases will not be considered on appeal unless an objection" is made to 
the trial court prior to the jury's dismissal); City of Homer v. Land's End Marine, 
459 P.2d 475, 480 (Alaska 1969) ("The rule that objection on the grounds of 
inconsistency is waived by failure to move for resubmission promotes the fair and 
expeditious correction of error." (quoting Cundiff v. Washburn, 393 F.2d 505, 
507 (7th Cir. 1968»). 
129. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
130. See infra Part V.B.I-2. Some commentators believe, however, that there is no 
real basis for treating these "types" of inconsistent verdicts differently as both 
results are illogical and both have the possibility of wrongful convictions. 
Kimberly Nolen Hopkins, Criminal Law, When Is an inconsistent Verdict Not 
Inconsistent?, 74 FLA. BAR J. 42, 44 (2000) (stating that "only legal minds would 
be able to see a difference where none 'truly' exists"). 
\31. See infra Part V.8.1. 
\32. See infra notes 135, 146 and accompanying text. 
133. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. 
\34. Wax, supra note 4, at 714-16. The term "repugnant" has been used 
interchangeably with the term inconsistent in New York. People v. Hodge, 802 
N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005). 
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York, while verdicts that are considered "repugnant" will be 
reversed. 135 
In People v. Tucker 136 the Court of Appeals of New York 
defined a repugnant verdict as one "where acquittal on one crime 
as charged to the jury is conclusive as to a necessary element of the 
other crime, as charged, for which the guilty verdict was 
rendered."l37 Additionally, the court held that in order to 
determine whether a verdict is repugnant, the appellate courts must 
only examine the instructions given to the jury, regardless of the 
accuracy of the instruction. 138 The court must then determine 
whether the jury, based upon the instructions that it received, 
"must have reached an inherently self-contradictory verdict.,,139 
Furthermore, New York case law requires that defendants register 
a protest on the issue of repugnancy prior to the discharge of the 
jury when any inconsistencies could be remedied by resubmission 
to the jury. 140 
Applying the definition laid out in Tucker, New York allows 
both compound and lesser included inconsistencies to be reversed. 
However, in the context of felony murder, a traditionally 
compound offense, New York law makes a substantial deviation. 
In New York if a defendant is acquitted of the underlying felony 
but convicted of felony murder, the conviction will not be 
vacated. 141 This is based on the finding that the completion of the 
underlying felony is not an essential element of felony murder. 142 
In fact, the Court of Appeals of New York described them as 
"substantively and generically entirely separate and disconnected 
offenses." 143 Justifying this statement, the court explained that the 
underlying felony "functions as a replacement for the mens rea ... 
necessary [to commit] common-law murder" and not an actual 
element of the crime. 144 
135. People v. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d 617, 619 (N. Y. 1981) ("Allowing such a verdict to 
stand is not merely inconsistent with justice, but is repugnant to it."). 
136. 431 N.E.2d 617. 
137. Jd. at 619. The court adopted the definition proposed by Steven T. Wax in his 
1979 law review article on inconsistent verdicts. See Wax, supra note 4, at 740-
42. 
138. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d at 619-20. 
139. Jd. at 620. 
140. People v. Sadoff, 437 N.E.2d 271, 272 (N.Y. 1982) (mem.). See also People v. 
Hines, 502 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (finding that defendant 
waived his right to challenge the verdict based on repugnancy by not raising the 
issue when the trial court had the opportunity to resubmit the case to the jury). 
141. See People v. Murray, 459 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
142. People v. Ponder, 433 N.Y.S.2d 288, 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 429 
N.E.2d 735 (N.Y. 1981). 
143. People v. Berzups, 402 N.E.2d 1155, 1160 (N.Y. 1980) (quoting People v. 
Nichols, 129 N.E. 883, 884 (N.Y. 1921)). 
144. Jd. The court explained that "[t]his view accords with the historical development 
of the felony murder doctrine and the legislative policy reflected in its current 
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2. Florida 
It is perhaps an understatement to call Florida's approach to 
inconsistent verdicts puzzling.145 Initially, the Supreme Court of 
Florida adopted the Dunn holding in 1946. 146 But then in 1979 the 
court, apparently, but not explicitly reversing itself, recognized an 
exception to the general rule for "true" inconsistencies. 147 
According to this rule, Florida courts will not uphold truly 
inconsistent verdicts, which the court defines as those verdicts 
where an acquittal on one count negates an element necessary to 
sustain a conviction on a separate count. 148 While Florida has 
allowed an exception for "truly" inconsistent verdicts, it has 
specifically refused to extend the exception to what it refers to as 
factually inconsistent verdicts. 149 
This distinction between a factual inconsistency and true 
inconsistency IS actually quite blurry based on Florida's 
jurisprudence. ISO Florida defines a factual inconsistency as one 
which, while defying logic, can still legally stand because one 
acquittal does not preclude a conviction upon another count. J5I 
Using this definition, those inconsistencies that arise in the context 
statutory descendant, both of which underscore the fact that the corpus of the 
crime is the killing of another." Id. 
145. See Hopkins, supra note 130, at 42 (referring to Florida's jurisprudence on the 
matter of inconsistent verdicts as an "enigma wrapped around [aJ riddle"). 
146. Goodwin v. State, 26 So. 2d 898, 899 (Fla. 1946). 
147. Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158,1160-61 (Fla. 1979) (holding that a conviction 
for felony murder must be vacated if the jury acquits the defendant of the 
underlying felony charge bccause thc acquittal constitutes a specific finding of 
the non-existence of that felony). 
148. Hopkins, supra note 130, at 44; Gonzalez v. State, 440 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1983). See also Eaton v. State, 438 So. 2d 822,823 (Fla. 1983) ("[Juries 
are J required to return consistent verdicts as to the guilt of an individual on 
interlocking charges."). 
149. State v. Connelly, 748 So. 2d 248,252 (Fla. 1999). The Florida Supreme Court 
held that such an extension would be contrary to precedent. Id. In Reid v. Slate, 
the court said it had "recognized only one exception to the general rule allowing 
inconsistent verdicts." 799 So. 2d 394, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). In 
Gonzalez, the court held that convicting defendant of robbery with a firearm 
while acquitting defendant of possession of a firearm during commission of 
felony did not require reversal as the latter is not a necessary clement of the 
former. 440 So. 2d at 516. The court justified its holding stating, "[ w ]hile it may 
be true that one cannot be convicted of possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony if it has been legally established that no felony took 
place, the converse is not true, at least in our view." Id. 
150. See Hopkins, supra note 130, at 44-46. Much of the confusion likely arises based 
on the terminology used by Florida courts. The situation this comment calls a 
lesser included inconsistency, Florida courts refer to as a factual inconsistency. 
See infra note 151 and accompanying text. Furthermore, what this comment 
identifies as a compound inconsistency is referred to by Florida courts as a 
"legal" or "true" inconsistency. See Hopkins, supra note 130, at 44. 
151. In other words, one count is not the predicate count to the compound offense, but 
rather is a lesser included offense. See, e.g., Fayson v. State, 698 So. 2d 825, 
826-27 (Fla. 1997). 
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of lesser-included offenses would be considered permissible 
inconsistency while compound inconsistencies would not be 
considered permissible. 
The case of Redondo v. State lS2 provides an excellent example. 
In Redondo, the court held that the verdict was truly 
inconsistent. 153 In this case the defendant was found guilty of 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, but was 
acquitted of the underlying felony of aggravated assault. IS4 The 
count of aggravated assault was the predicate felony that was 
needed to support his conviction on the compound offense of 
possession. ISS The court held that such a finding by the jury could 
not stand as the conviction on the compound offense "must stand 
or fall in conjunction with the underlying felony.,,156 
While both Alaska and Florida consider inconsistent verdicts 
reversible error, their reasoning and methods of dealing with such 
verdicts could not be more different. 157 The Florida case of 
Naumowicz v. State158 is illustrative as it stands in stark contrast to 
Alaska's holding in DeSacia. In Naumowicz, a Florida appellate 
court found it was not impermissibly inconsistent to acquit the 
defendant of nUl manslaughter for the death of the driver of 
another car and to convict the defendant of DUI manslaughter for 
the death of the passenger of the defendant's car. 159 The cases of 
DeSacia and Naumowicz are highly analogous-both cases 
involved two deaths which resulted from the same negligent act of 
one culpable defendant. 160 
Interestingly, DeSacia and Naumowicz resulted in polar 
opposite resolutions. 161 Alaska makes no such distinction between 
types of inconsistent verdicts and considers cases like Naumowicz 
152. 403 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1981). 
153. Id. at 956. 
154. Id. at 955 (the jury only convicted him of the lesser included offense of simple 
battery on the aggravated battery count). 
155. Id. at 955-56. 
156. Id. at 956. See also Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1979)(holding that a 
conviction for felony murder must be set aside when the jury has not convicted 
the defendant of the underlying felony). 
157. See supra Part V.A-B. 
158. 562 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
159. Id. at 713. 
160. See supra notes 116-23, 158-59 and accompanying text. In both cases it could 
not plausibly be argued that the defendant was more negligent toward one victim 
than towards another and yet the defendant was only found guilty in the death of 
one victim. See supra notes 122-23, 158-59 and accompanying text. 
161. DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 396, 381 (Alaska 1970) (ordering a new trial for 
conviction that had been reversed due to inconsistency); Naumowicz, 562 So. 2d 
at 713 (affirming jury's inconsistent acquittal). 
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and DeSacia reversible error,162 whereas Florida only allows for 
the reversal of compound inconsistencies. 163 
VI. DEFINING AN INCONSISTENT VERDICT FOR USE IN 
MARYLAND 
Florida's treatment of inconsistent verdicts provides the classic 
cautionary tale-what cannot be identified accurately cannot be 
prevented with any consistency. In order to prevent confusion, 
trial courts must be given concrete standards that can be used to 
identify those inconsistencies that are factual and those that are 
legal. This section will explain why only legally inconsistent 
verdicts should be prevented and it will then propose a specific 
definition for adoption in Maryland. 
A. Which Type of Inconsistency Should Be Forbidden: Factual, 
Legal or Both? 
Maryland should forbid both forms of legally inconsistent 
verdicts, while factually inconsistent verdicts, those aberrations 
resulting from a lay body's irrational behavior, should be permitted 
to stand. 164 By permitting factually inconsistent verdicts to stand, 
the jury is permitted to perform its traditional function of 
determining facts and assessing credibility.165 Allowing these 
types of inconsistencies is also beneficial because it is consistent 
with the concept that a jury is "an arbiter for the community" and 
because it ensures the sanctity of the jury's verdict. 166 This also 
avoids inquiries into juror's motives, intent, and understanding 
which can only be based on speculation. 167 Moreover, permitting 
reversals based upon the factuaVlegal distinction allows juries to 
retain the power to act irrationally so long as it is done in 
accordance with the criminal law and the requirements of due 
process. 
B. How to Define a "Legally Inconsistent" Verdict 
In order to ensure uniformity, Maryland should adopt an 
explicit definition of what constitutes a legally inconsistent verdict. 
The definition proposed by Steven T. Wax would be ideal for 
Maryland: "[w]hen acquittal on one charge is conclusive as to an 
162. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 378 (stating that creating a distinction "tends to confuse 
substance with semantics"). 
163. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text. 
164. Wax, supra note 4, at 741. Illogical or inconsistent applications of the facts 
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element which is necessary to and inherent in a charge on which a 
conviction has occurred, the conviction should be reversed.,,168 
Using this definition, any factual aberrations would be pennitted 
by trial courts so long as the verdicts did not create a statutory 
contradiction. 169 Perhaps most importantly, this definition would 
require Maryland courts to construe inconsistencies strictly in 
terms of the criminal law and without speCUlating into the jury's 
deliberations, motives or intent. 170 This definition is also 
beneficial because it would require the reversal of both lesser-
. I d d d d··· 171 mc u e an compoun mconslstencles. 
VII. HOW TO DEAL WITH INCONSISTENT VERDICTS IN 
MARYLAND 
This comment proposed a definition for Maryland to adopt in 
order to help identify legally inconsistent verdicts. However, the 
inevitable next question is what to do with such a verdict once it 
has been identified. 
Eric Muller suggests three possible alternatives to the Supreme 
Court's treatment of inconsistent verdicts in Powell: hannless 
error review, refusing to accept such verdicts, and mistrial at the 
defendant's option.172 This comment will explain these 
alternatives in greater depth and then determine which alternative 
would be best for Maryland to adopt. 173 
A. Harmless Error Review 
In his article, Muller claims the best possible solution would be 
to treat inconsistent jury verdicts as a variety of trial error, in 
which the conviction will be reversed unless the error was 
hannless to the defendant. 174 Commonly, when a defendant shows 
an error has occurred at the trial level, the appellate court will be 
compelled to reverse the conviction if the error was not 
hannless. 175 Harmless error review requires federal appellate 
168. /d. at 740 (emphasis in original). 
169. /d. 
170. See id. at 740-41. 
171. See supra Part [I.A. (discussing compound and lesser-included inconsistencies). 
172. Muller, supra note 2, at 821-22. 
173. This determination will bc made under the assumption that the proposed 
definition in Part VI. will be adopted in conjunction with the proposed procedure. 
174. Muller, supra note 2, at 821-22. 
175. ld. at 822. See O'Neal v. MCAninch, 5\3 U.S. 432, 435-42 (1995) (vacating 
defendant's conviction and holding that if the court reviewing a habeas corpus 
petition had grave doubts about whether an error in state court was harmless-it 
was required to treat it as not being harmless error); Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18,24 (1967) (reversing defendant's murder conviction and holding it was 
not harmless error for prosecutor to imply guilt from defendant's refusal to 
testify). 
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courts to find that the error did not have "substantial and injurious 
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." I 76 
Muller favors this approach because it has more "teeth" than 
sufficiency of the evidence review, the method relied upon by the 
Supreme Court, because harmless error review does not consider 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the state. 177 Essentially, 
Muller believes that harmless error review, by invoking a higher 
standard, will provide greater protection to criminal defendants 
than a review of the sufficiency of the evidence. 178 
Muller, however, admits to the greatest flaw of this proposed 
solution. 179 Usually when harmless error review is employed, 
appellate courts know that error has occurred and that this error has 
harmed the defendant. 180 It is then the court's duty to determine 
whether this error resulted in the defendant's conviction. 181 This 
form of analysis allows reviewing judges to make a "tolerably 
educated guess" as to whether or not the defendant was harmed by 
the jury's improper actions. 182 
Ultimately, this solution is less than ideal as it would require 
judges to make case-by-case assessments and to rely on pure 
conjecture as to the jury's true reasons for rendering an 
inconsistent verdict. Furthermore, this system only allows reversal 
of inconsistent verdicts the court deems "harmful," which could 
presumably result in unequal treatment of similarly situated 
defendants. This system would also ignore one of the main points 
of this comment, which is that inconsistent verdicts in and of 
themselves are harmful and should not be accepted regardless of an 
appellate judge's subjective determination of harm to an individual 
defendant. 
176. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) (reversing defendant's 
conviction for conspiracy where trial court committed error by improperly 
combining trials of multiple defendants). In Dorsey v. Slate, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland concluded that when an error has been proven the court 
must be able to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way 
influenced the verdict and was harmless, otherwise the verdict must be reversed. 
276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976). 
177. Muller, supra note 2, at 824. 
178. ld. 
179. ld. at 824-25. 
180. ld. at 825. 
181. ld. 
182. ld. at 825-26. Muller argues that this is similar to the court's function in 
determining whether erroneously admitted evidence prejudiced the outcome. Id. 
The court can never know what weight the jury afforded to that particular piece 
of evidence and so is required to make a reasonable guess. Id. 
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B. Mistrial at the Defendant's Option 
Muller's second proposed solution is to allow individual 
defendants to declare a mistrial at their own option.183 This would 
allow defendants to determine whether their interests are best 
served by accepting or rejecting the inconsistent verdict. 184 Using 
this option, defendants would be required to either accept the entire 
verdict, presumably including an inconsistent acquittal and 
conviction, or reject the entire verdict. 185 If the defendant elected 
to reject the entire verdict, he or she would then move for a mistrial 
and be subject to retrial on all counts at the discretion of the 
state. 186 Muller argues that this solution is fair to defendants 
because the defendant is in a far better position than the appellate 
courts to know whether the jury "punished her with a groundless 
conviction or pardoned her with an unwarranted acquittal.,,187 
On its face, this proposal would seem to violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause since the government would be allowed to retry a 
case after the jury has already announced a verdict of acquittal. 188 
Generally, however, when a defendant successfully moves for a 
mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause will not bar the state from 
retrying the case. 189 The Supreme Court noted that the important 
factor is that it is the defendant who "retain[ s] primary control over 
the course to be followed in the event of ... error.,,190 
The solution proposed by Muller leaves the defendant with the 
ultimate choice of action, thereby not depriving him of his Double 
Jeopardy right. 191 While this solution is feasible and certainly fair 
183. ld. at 822, 831-32. 
184. ld. at 822, 832. 
185. ld. at 832. 
186. ld. 
187. ld. 
188. ld. at 833. The Double Jeopardy Clause has been held to apply to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 
(1969). While the Maryland Constitution does not specifically provide Double 
Jeopardy protection, its common law docs. State v. Woodson, 338 Md. 322, 327-
28, 658 A.2d 272, 275 (1995). 
189. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607, 608-12 (1976) ("A motion by the 
defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to rc-
prosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or 
judicial error. "). 
190. Jd. at 609. Furthermore, the Double Jeopardy Clause only prevents retrial on an 
acquittal after that verdict is final. Muller, supra note 2, at 829. See also Heinze 
v. State, 184 Md. 613, 616, 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945) ("It is a fundamental 
principle that the verdict of a jU1)' in a criminal case has no effect in law until it is 
recorded and finally accepted by the court."). Furthermore, in Maryland, a 
verdict does not become final until after the jU1)' has been polled and its verdict is 
accepted by the court. Smith v. State, 299 Md. 158, 168, 472 A.2d 988, 993 
(1984). 
191. Muller, supra note 2, at 833. 
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to defendants, it is not ideal because it lacks the simplicity of other 
alternatives. 
C. Refusal by Trial Court to Accept Inconsistent Verdicts 
Another alternative proposed by Muller requires trial judges to 
refuse to accept inconsistent verdicts and to require juries to cure 
their error. 192 This approach would be best for Maryland to adopt 
as its case law has already demonstrated a tendency to favor this 
approach to jury verdicts. 193 The Maryland Rules already permit 
judges to discharge the jury or require further deliberation if the 
verdict is not unanimous upon polling. 194 Additionally, it is 
generally accepted in Maryland that verdicts which are defective in 
form or substance should not be accepted by the trial court. 195 
In Heinze, the Court of Appeals declared, "[i]t is essential for 
the prompt and efficient administration of justice to prevent 
defective verdicts from being entered upon the records of the court 
as well as to ascertain the real intention of the jury in their 
finding."I96 The court said it was, therefore, the judge's 
responsibility to explain the defect in the verdict to the jury and to 
allow them the option to remedy it by returning to deliberations or 
by clarifying their verdict in the presence of the court. 197 
In addition to Maryland's openness to this procedure, this 
option presents the simplest and the most efficient means of 
preventing inconsistent verdicts as it minimizes the role of 
appellate courts. Requiring defendants to raise objections to 
inconsistent verdicts at the trial level will help ensure that juries 
are given the opportunity to correct inconsistencies prior to their 
polling and dismissal. 198 
192. Muller, supra note 2, at 827. See also FED. R. Crv. P. 49(b) ("When the answers 
are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the 
general verdict, judgment shaH not be entered, but the court shall return the jury 
for furthcr consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial."). 
In order for judges to identity which verdicts are unacceptably inconsistent the 
previously proposed definition should be employed. See supra Part VI.B. 
193. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text. 
194. MD. RULE § 4-327(c) ("Ifthcjurors do not unanimously concur in the verdict, the 
court may direct the jury to retire for further deliberation, or may discharge the 
jury if satisfied that a unanimous verdict cannot be reached."). 
195. Heinze, 184 Md. at 617, 42 A.2d at 130. 
196. Id. 
197. ld. at 617-18, 42 A.2d at 130. The court noted it would be "safer" to send the 
jury back to the deliberation room with instructions concerning necessary 
corrections, so that further consideration could be conducted without outside 
influences. Jd. at 618, 42 A.2d at 130-31. 
198. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The reasons cited by the Supreme Court to protect inconsistent 
verdicts-mistake, compromise, and lenity-do not prove worthy 
of protection in the face of the harm posed to defendants by 
inconsistent jury verdicts. In formulating an approach for 
Maryland, it would be prudent to borrow concepts from each of the 
states which currently allow reversal of inconsistent verdicts. 
New York and Florida provide helpful guidance when 
formulating an approach for Maryland by showing the importance 
of providing a concrete definition when drawing distinctions 
between forms of inconsistent verdicts. Following their lead, but 
embellishing upon it slightly, Maryland should refuse to accept 
only legally inconsistent verdicts, including both compound and 
lesser included inconsistencies, in accordance with the proposed 
definition that would rely primarily on statutory analysis. 
Meanwhile, Alaska and New York demonstrate an efficient means 
of dealing with legally inconsistent verdicts by requiring those 
inconsistencies to be cured at the trial level as the court will refuse 
to accept compound and lesser-included inconsistencies in the 
verdict. This two-pronged approach will work together to ensure 
that inconsistent verdicts are uniformly recognized and not entered 
as judgment. 
In summation, Maryland should break ranks with the majority 
of its sister states and declare legally inconsistent jury verdicts 
invalid as they are fundamentally unfair to defendants, go against 
major principles of law, and defy logic. 
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